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The Los Angeles Times reported Oct. 10 that the U.S. military is crafting a new strategy to reduce combat operations and focus more on training tribal militias as well as government forces in Afghanistan. Many tribal militias in the country’s Pashtun areas are closely tied to elements of the Taliban, and the Oct. 10 report sheds light on how the United States might implement a strategy of reconciliation with the Taliban, which would entail backing more pragmatic elements against the hardliners.
Such a strategy would track very closely with the most recent U.S. strategy in Iraq, where U.S. forces negotiated agreements with Sunni Awakening Councils (which include former Sunni insurgents) to oppose al Qaeda in Iraq. The situation in Afghanistan, however, is quite different — and more challenging. In Iraq, rallying opposition against al Qaeda was fairly straightforward, since most of the jihadists were foreigners, while most jihadists in Afghanistan are Taliban and very few are outsiders. Another difference is that the United States used the threat of sectarian strife against the minority Sunnis to gain their support in Iraq, while in Afghanistan the vast majority of people are Sunni Muslims and sectarian strife is much less of a threat. Also, the Taliban are the most powerful force among the Pashtun people in Afghanistan and have less incentive to cooperate with the United States than the Sunnis did in Iraq.
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